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Susanne Lütz and Dagmar Eberle ∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Whether distinct national “varieties of capitalism” will survive in
an increasingly globalizing economy has become one of the most
hotly debated issues in Comparative Political Economy since the
early 1990s. The internationalization of business and financial
markets, the rise of institutional investors, the harmonization of
legal rules in the context of the European single market project and
the transformation of businesses practices and strategies pose
significant challenges to national corporate governance regimes
which are a core element of national political economies. Whereas
the liberal model of capitalism and corporate governance is
apparently better able to cope with these new challenges, their
destabilizing effect on traditional institutions and practices seems
to be particularly high in the coordinated market economies of
continental Europe.
In this paper, we explore the pressures for change and the
responses in the case of German corporate governance regulation.
Since the mid-1990s, the German corporate governance regime has
experienced a series of statutory and self-regulatory reforms which
reflect increasing pressure to move towards the market-oriented,
Anglo-Saxon model. We explore to what extent the regulatory
framework has been adapted to Anglo-Saxon norms and
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institutional structures in different fields of corporate governance
and what the driving forces and mechanisms of convergence were.
While economic approaches narrowly confine corporate
governance to the control of managers by shareholders, we prefer a
more inclusive perspective. We define corporate governance
regulation as the rules that shape the distribution of influence and
control over company policy among different groups of
stakeholders (Goyer 2001: 135; Streeck and Höpner 2003: 14).
Corporate governance research usually distinguishes between
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (cf. Mann
2003: 78-98). The former operate via the institutional framework of
the firm. Within the corporation, the board of directors constitutes
the main device for monitoring management. External control is
exercised by market forces and by outside actors. The main external
control mechanism is the capital market in its function as market
for corporate control. Located at the interface between internal and
external corporate governance, between supplying information on
the financial situation of a company to corporate insiders and to
outside investors, is accounting (Baetge and Thiele 1998: 722;
Schmidt and Tyrell 2005: 495-502). The state shapes the structures
and the functioning of the different governance mechanisms
primarily through company law and capital market regulations. In
the field of accounting, private standard-setters have traditionally
played an important role in some jurisdictions.
Following the “Varieties of Capitalism” typology, two ideal types
of corporate governance regimes can be distinguished: marketoriented “outsider” systems and network-oriented “insider”
systems (Franks and Mayer 1995; Hall and Soskice 2001). They are
characterized by systematic variances in the design and the
importance of the different corporate governance mechanisms. In
the “outsider” systems of Anglo-Saxon countries, share ownership
is widely dispersed among a multitude of investors who generally
have an arm’s length relationship with the firm and rarely
intervene into its affairs. Market-based mechanisms of monitoring
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and disciplining management serve to direct corporate strategy
towards maximizing shareholder value. Company law tends to be
more flexible and enabling while the internal organization of the
company, especially the structure and composition of the board, is
to a large extent perceived as a matter of private ordering and case
law. The one-tier board is generally dominated by the top
management, especially the CEO, who typically acts as chairman of
the board (Cioffi 2003: 9; Donnelly et al. 2001: 11). Reporting rules in
the Anglo-Saxon world are geared to the provision of information
for the capital market. They provide for unbiased information
about the success of a business, its state of affairs and its future
prospects, usually reflected in the “true and fair view principle”
(Nobes and Parker 2004: 22-23). Common Law systems rely on a
limited amount of statute law which is then interpreted by the
courts. Accounting rules in such a context are established as
recommendations or standards by private accountants.
German corporate governance used to be a prototype of the
“insider” system. In this model, ownership concentration is
generally high, and the relationships among firms are often
characterized by cross-shareholdings and cross-directorates. Thus,
firms are effectively shielded from hostile takeovers. As “patient
capital” is provided by blockholders and long-term bank credits,
the market valuation of the firm is less important for corporate
policy. German company law lays down strict, mandatory rules
which govern the internal structures and procedures of corporate
decision-making. This comprehensive body of rules reflects not
only Germany’s legalistic tradition, but also a pluralistic notion of
the “interest of the corporation” which is understood to comprise
the interests of shareholders as well as employees, creditors,
suppliers, consumers and the general public (Hopt 1998).
Correspondingly, internal governance provides stakeholder
coalitions with institutionalized mechanisms of voice within the
company to influence managerial decision-making. While the dayto-day running of the company is assigned to the management
board (Vorstand), the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is responsible
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for the appointment and monitoring of the management board and
for approving certain business decisions. Board members typically
represent major shareholders, financial and business partners of the
company, and also labor. In coal, iron and steel companies with
more than 1,000 employees, supervisory boards are organized on a
model of paritary co-determination. With the Co-determination
Law of 1976, this model was made mandatory for all companies
with more than 2,000 employees (Hall and Soskice 2001: 23;
Neubürger 2003: 179; Schmidt 2003: 9).
Financial reporting rules are primarily focused on the protection of
creditors’ interests by stabilizing the company and by providing
the firm some autonomy in the composition of its annual account.
The German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) allows the
company to take “hidden reserves” into account and to calculate
gains and losses over longer periods (principle of prudence).
Moreover, financial statements are also used to determine income
and corporate tax. Due to this close linkage of tax assessment and
financial reporting the state is equal to any other investor thereby
turning into the “silent stakeholder” of the firm. Given that the
German legal system has its origins in Roman law, its accounting
rules are part of the code law system which means they can only be
changed through legislation. Accordingly, decisions on accounting
rules in Germany are viewed not only as a technical matter on
which a group of accounting experts should be competent but the
rule development process is coordinated by public actors, such as
administrators in the Federal Ministries of Finance and Justice
while only a relatively minor role is ascribed to the audit profession
(Mc Leavy et al. 2004: 292-294).
The debate in political economy offers two contrary propositions
on the likely course of the reforms in German corporate governance
regulation. The institutionalist approaches of Comparative Political
Economy emphasize the stickiness of national institutional
configurations. The most prominent theoretical framework
predicting persistent diversity is the “varieties of capitalism”
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approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). In this perspective, institutional
complementarities and comparative advantages resulting from the
specific national institutional arrangements create powerful
incentives for national actors to respond to external pressures in
path-dependant ways.
In contrast, the International Political Economy literature observes
the global diffusion of a neo-liberal version of market capitalism
and regulation. This approach would lead us expect a much greater
convergence towards a market-oriented “outsider” system. It sees
the competition for the most mobile segments of capital as driving
force for processes of convergence (e.g. Cerny 1997). IPE studies
draw attention to transnational coalitions of political and economic
actors, e.g. at the European level, who push for the liberalization of
national markets (cf. van Apeldoorn 1999). Globally active private
players are accorded an important role in the spread and
harmonization of regulatory standards across national borders (cf.
Cutler et al. 1999, Cutler 2003).
Our paper traces the patterns and driving forces of change in two
areas of corporate governance regulation, namely internal
governance and accounting. In both cases, we observe a substantial
transformation as regulation has been brought more into line with
Anglo-Saxon norms and practices. Yet, the comparison of the two
regulatory fields reveals significant differences in terms of the
outcomes of transformation as well as the driving forces and
mechanisms. In accounting, the structural power of Anglo-Saxon
actors triggered a process of multilevel coordination leading to a
high degree of convergence towards Anglo-Saxon standards and
institutions of standard-setting. A much greater stability of the
domestic institutional framework can be seen in the case of internal
governance, where actors perceived market pressures to adapt
regulatory standards to a moderate degree, but not the institutions
of internal control. While the two strands of political economy offer
important insights for analyzing these changes, both fail to account
for the different patterns of convergence and divergence in the two
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cases. Therefore, we argue that the political economy approaches
have to be combined with a policy analysis perspective so as to
capture the sectorally distinct interplay of national and
transnational actors which was crucial for shaping the processes
and the results of regulatory regime transformation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following two sections analyze
the national regulatory reforms in both fields against the backdrop
of international developments. After comparing the transformation
processes, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the
theoretical implications of our findings.

II. INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
EMULATION TRIGGERED BY PERCEIVED MARKET
PRESSURE
In the post-war era, Germany’s constitutionalist and integrationist
system of internal corporate governance was largely shielded from
any pressures to move towards more market-oriented standards.
This changed from the mid-1990s onwards, when state and private
actors began to reassess the usefulness of the traditional corporate
governance regime in light of the internationalization of financial
markets and general concerns about the insufficient dynamics of
the German economy (cf. Cioffi 2002). Since then, the regulatory
framework for internal corporate governance has undergone a
series of statutory and self-regulatory reforms, which brought a
moderate degree of convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model.
German regulation has moved towards Anglo-Saxon standards on
transparency, (supervisory) board independence and accountability
to all shareholders, although the German provisions on board
independence are considerably less stringent than those applying
in the US and the UK. The regulatory system which was
traditionally based on mandatory company law has been
supplemented by a self-regulatory “Code of Best Practice” modeled
on the British example. However, Germany’s characteristic internal
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governance structures – the two-tier board system and the codetermination regime – have remained fairly stable so far. Hence,
we find a mix of institutional stability and (limited) convergence on
standards.
The convergence on Anglo-Saxon standards was mainly driven by
perceived market pressure emanating from the internationalizing
capital markets and, in particular, the rising power of Anglo-Saxon
institutional investors. The adaptation process was conducted by a
national “modernization coalition” which included company law
experts, government officials and globally oriented financial
institutions and companies. Foreign institutional investors were, by
and large, not directly involved in the national reform process and,
until recently, have tended not to adopt a strong activist approach
vis-à-vis German companies in terms of governance (Interviews
D2, D29, D37). With the exception of one prominent representative,
domestic institutional investors were largely inactive in the reform
efforts, although some large German institutional investors have
begun to emulate Anglo-Saxon investor activism (Handelsblatt, 5
May 2004; Interviews D4, D21). The two national associations of
private shareholders have been actively engaged in the debates, but
they were too weak to propel reforms by themselves. The
beneficiaries of the old insider model, the business community and
labor unions, constituted the most important veto players,
obstructing reforms which they saw as detrimental to their vital
interests. The two-tier board structure has not been questioned by
any player.
The first phase of reforms was triggered in the mid-1990s by a
proposal for a far-reaching company law reform drafted by
Theodor Baums, a professor for company law, and Hans-Martin
Bury, a young MP from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Cioffi
2002: 14-18). Against the backdrop of several spectacular cases of
financial mismanagement at German companies (e.g. the cases of
Metallgesellschaft, Balsam and the Schneider property
development group), the governing CDU-CSU/FDP coalition
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responded by developing a – more moderate – reform bill which
was passed in 1998. Rather than severely curtailing the role of
banks and corporate networks in internal corporate governance, as
envisaged in SPD draft legislation, the so-called “Control and
Transparency Act” (KonTraG) provided only for modest
limitations on the power of these traditional “insiders”, although it
introduced the principle of “one share, one vote”. The law chiefly
sought to increase the professionalism and the transparency of the
supervisory board (Ziegler 2000: 203-206).
The KonTraG represents the first step to move the German
regulatory framework closer to the Anglo-Saxon outsider model.
By improving transparency, accountability and efficiency of
oversight, the drafters of the KonTraG sought to make the shares of
German companies more attractive for domestic private investors
and for foreign institutional investors whose growing importance
was explicitly underlined (Interviews D11, D18, D21; Ziegler 2000:
203-204). However, the move towards a more capital marketdriven regime was to be achieved within the traditional
institutional framework. The reformers saw no need to change to a
one-tier board (Interview D 11). While no political force or interest
group was willing to challenge the fundamentals of the codetermination regime, the first draft of the KonTraG had proposed
to reduce the size of the supervisory board (and thus the number of
union representatives). This provision was removed after protests
by the trade unions, social democrats and the trade union wing of
the CDU (Cioffi 2002: 18-19; Handelsblatt, 22 April 1997).
The passage of the KonTraG was facilitated by the changing
strategic interests of large banks and of globally oriented German
companies. The major private banks had already started to extract
themselves from the close personal and capital ties of “Germany
Inc.” as they were reorienting their business strategy from close
lending relationships towards investment banking services. Large
German companies were also increasing their financial autonomy
from banks. From the mid-1990s onwards, more and more globally
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oriented firms espoused shareholder value philosophies, a trend
certainly reflecting the growing foreign investment in blue chip
companies (Beyer and Höpner 2003; Lütz 2005). Due to these
changes, bank and industry associations came to accept the broad
lines of the government’s moderate reform bill, while opposing the
more radical SPD proposal (Cioffi 2002: 17; Interview D21).
In contrast to the KonTraG which originated in the political realm,
the initiative for the second round of reforms, the formulation of a
German corporate governance code, came from the private sector.
The introduction of an official code for the German market in 2002
can be seen as milestone for the convergence towards Anglo-Saxon
standards on internal corporate governance, as the code explicitly
emulated practices promoted by Anglo-Saxon investors in terms of
form and content. While the KonTraG was also geared to national
investors as its drafters sought to promote an equity culture in
Germany, the code’s central target group were foreign institutional
investors.
A self-regulatory “code of best practice” which is to be enforced by
market forces was first adopted in Great Britain in 1992. The
Cadbury Code laid down a set of corporate governance
recommendations for companies. While the provisions of the code
were not mandatory, companies were required to state whether
they complied with the rules and to explain any deviations. This
concept was copied in many other markets. Most codes focus on
questions of transparency and the role and responsibilities of the
board, calling for boards to include a number of “independent”
non-executive directors without close ties to top managers and/or
the company so as to ensure effective and objective oversight
(Cadbury 2000: 9-11). In the US, activist public and union pension
funds who issued their own corporate governance guidelines
began to urge companies to appoint a majority of independent
directors in the 1990s (Monks and Minow 2004:167).
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In Germany, two private ad-hoc commissions presented – more or
less competing – corporate governance codes in 2000. The first
group which included company law experts and industry leaders
had been assembled by Christian Strenger, the former head of the
investment fund DWS and public “figurehead” of the investor
scene. Strenger saw corporate governance guidelines not only as
necessary to prevent undesirable developments in companies. He
argued that the lack of a set of internationally acceptable principles
which would allow investors to systematically evaluate the
practices of individual companies put German companies at a
disadvantage in the international financial markets (Schneider and
Strenger 2000: 106-109). Like Strenger, a number of global players
in German finance and industry had become concerned that
international investors perceived Germany as a “developing
country” in terms of corporate governance and were therefore
suspicious of the German market (Interviews D6, D31). Foreign
investors, most prominently CalPERS, had called for a German
code (CalPERS 1998). In line with international examples, the code
developed by the Strenger group emphasized the oversight
function of the (supervisory) board. The second code, which was
drafted by a group of company directors and consultants around
Axel von Werder, an economics professor, centered more on the
management board (Berliner Initiativkreis German Code of
Corporate Governance 2000).
German companies perceived the existence of two codes as
problematic (Interviews D 24, D 30). In this situation, the
government stepped in and eventually took on the task to
coordinate the code formulation. Spurred into action by the nearcollapse of Philipp Holzmann, a leading German building
company, the new SPD-Green government put Baums in charge of
a government commission which was to review the German
regulatory framework in terms of terms of potential weaknesses
and the expectations of the international capital markets
(Interviews D16, D21, D26). The so-called Baums Commission
which comprised representatives of all stakeholders strongly
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endorsed the idea of a formal German code. Following its
recommendations, the government set up a standing commission
which drew up a comprehensive code. The industry and its
association, the BDI, had warmed to the introduction of a code as it
was made clear that the code would not be purely regulatory, but
that a major function of this instrument would be to explain the
existing legal framework to foreign investors (Interview D21).
German experts and market players felt that the bad international
reputation of the German regime stemmed to a significant extent
from the lack of knowledge about the German two-tier system and
its peculiarities (Interviews D2, D6).
The code sought to address the main criticisms voiced by AngloSaxon investors, inter alia by promoting transparency of the
company and its governance and by introducing independence
provisions for the supervisory board (Cromme 2001). However, the
code did not give a general definition of independence. It
recommended that supervisory board members should not hold
parallel board mandates in competitor firms, that no more than two
of the members should be former members of the management
board of the respective company and that the audit committee
should not be chaired by a former executive. Also, supervisory
board members were advised to disclose conflicts of interest which
may result from an affiliation with lenders or other business
partners of the company. In the case of material and permanent
conflicts of interest, the respective board member should terminate
his mandate. Compared to Anglo-Saxon standards, the code
applied a rather cautious and selective approach towards
independence (Hopt and Leyens 2004: 7).
In effect, the code stopped short of fundamentally challenging the
position of traditional “insiders” in the board who represent large
shareholders and business relationships, which had been decried
by foreign investors (CalPERS 1998). This reflects mainly the strong
position of company representatives in the multi-stakeholder code
commission. Furthermore, reformers like Strenger pursued a
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relatively moderate, incrementalist approach. However, there are
also structural constraints, as paritary co-determination hinders farreaching independence requirements (Interviews D2, D30, D31;
Strenger 2001: 59-60).
Not surprisingly, subsequent initiatives to achieve tighter rules in
sensitive areas proved to be controversial. In 2003, the code
commission had, under pressure from shareholder representatives
and the government, introduced a rule prescribing individualized
disclosure of managers’ pay (Handelsblatt, 22 May 2003) Yet,
compliance with this rule remained sketchy, so that the
government took legislative action in 2005 (Interview D26). In the
same year, the issue of board independence was once more put on
the agenda of the code commission by the EU Commission which
had, in the previous year, issued a recommendation aimed at
strengthening the role of independent directors (European
Commission 2005; Interview EU8). While the final recommendation
was considerably softened due to protests from industry and some
member states, and its far-reaching independence requirements
were shifted to an annex, its full implementation would have meant
significant changes to the German code. But the code commission
used the latitude provided by the text of the recommendation and
its non-binding character and opted for a minimalist interpretation.
The code commission followed the broad lines of the EU
recommendation by calling for “an adequate number” of
independent supervisory board members and by adopting a
general definition of independence as “no business or personal
relations with the company or its management”. But, unlike the EU
proposal, this definition left out relations to a controlling
shareholder (Spindler 2005). Moreover, it was decided not to adopt
a set of detailed independence criteria as outlined in the EU
recommendation’s annex. Business representatives in the
commission stated, for once, that the code already addressed the
problem in its sections on conflicts of interest. Also, it was felt that
the advantages of the traditional function of the supervisory board
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as “relationship board” (Hopt 1998: 234) should not be easily
disregarded. A formalistic approach towards independence would
mean that the knowledge brought to the board by a client or
supplier would be lost. More generally, commission members
argued that the stringent and formalistic Anglo-Saxon
independence standards respond to specific problems of one-tier
boards, whereas a two-tier board model already provides for
certain checks and balances (Interviews D6, D31, D32). Another
controversial aspect which the EU recommendation sought to
restrict was the practice of appointing an outgoing CEO as
supervisory board chairman. This had become more and more
common in Germany, but was strongly criticized by domestic
private and institutional investors. The confluence of these
influences prompted the code commission to introduce a provision
that it should not be the rule for former top executives to become
chair of the supervisory board (Interview D 20).
Besides the code, the German regulatory framework saw further
legislative changes. This third round of reforms also goes back to
recommendations of the Baums Commission. Under the impression
of recent scandals in Germany, the Baums Commission had
advised to move the liability regime closer to the Anglo-Saxon
model in terms of scope and enforcement of shareholders’ claims
(Regierungskommission
Corporate
Governance
2001).
A
comprehensive and effective liability regime was perceived to be a
constitutive element of a developed capital market. Thus, by
tightening the rules for the liability of directors, the government
sought to strengthen the confidence of all investors in the German
market and to further the global “marketing” of the German system
(BMF 2004; Interviews D21, D24, D29). Most of the proposed
changes were implemented by two laws passed in 2005. As these
bills also addressed concerns of the business community, they were
not very controversial. However, the most significant reform bill
which would have made board members personally liable for false
and misleading information to the capital market, met with fierce

14

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 03

resistance by the business community and was withdrawn by the
government (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 January 2005).
Although the Baums Commission had been given a very broad
mandate, Baums and the government had agreed to keep the issue
of co-determination out of the discussion, because it was too
divisive. But the co-determination regime is coming under pressure
by initiatives of the EU to facilitate corporate restructuring and
mobility within the common market. Whereas the EU Commission,
due to the different varieties of capitalism, had been unable to
substantially harmonize company law in the EU, in recent years, it
achieved the passage of the European Company Statute and the
Directive on cross-border mergers (Donnelly 2005: 2-4; Rhodes and
van Apeldoorn 1998: 422-424). These measures and several rulings
by the European Court of Justice will fuel open competition
between national legal forms. While the German industry had long
acquiesced to the co-determination regime, these developments
have prompted its large associations to mount a campaign to
restrict co-determination (BDA and BDI 2004). Although the
incumbent SPD-Green government rejected any fundamental
changes, it accepted the need to make the co-determination regime
“fit” for the new European context and appointed a corporatist
commission to develop a reform concept. But when this
commission finished its work at the end of 2006, it was unable to
produce a consensual report, as business and trade union
representatives could not agree (Handelsblatt, 20 December 2006).
However, it remains to be seen how long the trade unions and their
allies in the SPD and the trade union wing of the Conservatives will
be able to resist change.
Further changes in the German corporate governance regime may
also lie ahead due to recent developments in investor activism.
There are signs that foreign institutional investors are intervening
more forcefully in the governance of German companies. While
activist Anglo-Saxon investors have engaged in a dialogue with the
management and have also handed over their corporate
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governance principles to companies, they have generally refrained
from using the same aggressive tactics to shake up companies as in
their home markets (Interview D2). However, the events at
Deutsche Börse in 2005 where rebellious investors led by hedge
funds ousted both the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory
board may signal a watershed (Interview D29). Recent protests by
Anglo-Saxon – and German – institutional investors against
problematic corporate governance arrangements at VW and
ThyssenKrupp also seem to indicate that the pressure on German
companies is becoming more intense (Financial Times, 2 May 2006,
20 January 2007; Interview D 37).

III. ACCOUNTING: ANGLO-SAXON HEGEMONY
AND MULTILEVEL COORDINATION
The German accounting model has to a large extent converged on
international financial reporting standards and Anglo-Saxon
institutions of standard-setting. In accounting, there has been a
movement towards Anglo-Saxon norms of disclosure and investor
protection in financial reporting. In 1998, Germany adopted
legislation that allowed listed firms to depart from the German
commercial code (HGB) and to prepare their consolidated accounts
in accordance with U.S. GAAP and the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) issued by the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). From the continental
European viewpoint, IFRS is a body of accounting rules firmly
rooted in the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, by emphasizing
the purpose to give useful information to various users (mostly
investors) in order to improve their financial decisions. The overall
objective is to give a fair presentation of the state of affairs and
performance of a business (“true and fair view principle”), so that
users of financial statements can make good decisions (Nobes and
Parker 2004: 111-112).
The development of accounting standards used to be coordinated
by public actors while only a minor role was ascribed to the audit
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profession. Since 1998, however, accounting standards are set by
the German Accounting Standards Committee (Deutsches
Rechnungslegungs Standards Komitee, DRSC), a private sector
institution. The committee was mandated to advise the Ministry of
Justice on changes to accounting law, to adapt German accounting
principles to international norms by 2004, and to represent
Germany in international standard-setting fora (Ernst 1999: 346347). The DRSC was modeled on the U.S. standard-setter FASB, in
instigating due process for the development of its standards and in
being staffed with independent experts – three from industry, two
auditors, one financial analyst and one academic (Mc Leavy et al.
2004: 312-315).
How can we explain this substantial degree of convergence on the
Anglo-Saxon model? In general, we argue that the regulatory
transformation here was triggered by the “structural power”
(Strange 1994, 1996) of Anglo-Saxon actors in general and the U.S.
in particular. Power came about in forms of expert-, market- and
political pressure which, by triggering further coordination
activities in the European Union, left German actors not much
leeway for institutional entrepreneurship. In fact, it was a highly
internationalized network of actors, comprising large German
companies, large audit networks, U.S. regulators and the European
Commission, pushing for a reorganization under Anglo-Saxon
auspices, while being confronted with domestic opposition.
Until the mid-1990s, pressures to adapt German accounting rules
and institutions to Anglo-Saxon standards were relatively low,
given that the European capital market was not far developed and
efforts of European harmonization remained relatively stuck. The
4th Company Law Directive (1978) and the 7th Directive on
Consolidated Accounts (1983) compromised between conflicting
interests and accounting views of the Anglo-Saxon and continental
European tradition by incorporation of a considerable number of
optional treatments; the resulting vagueness (e.g. various

2007]

ON THE ROAD TO ANGLO-SAXON CAPITALISM?

17

interpretations of the true and fair view principle) led to diversity
in the process of national implementation.
In the meantime, Anglo-Saxon standard-setters began to structure
the field and to shift their national model of setting accounting
standards by private professionals on to the global level. The UK
sought to keep as much freedom as possible from the European
harmonization process through cooperation with “leading” AngloSaxon standard setters within the so-called Group of 4 (comprising
the UK, Canada, U.S., Australia/New Zealand). The Study Group
consisted of high profile practitioners from international
accounting firms, centered around Sir Henry Benson from the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales. The aim
of the group was to strengthen private standard-setting as an
alternative to EU regulation in order to open up new markets for
Anglo-Saxon auditing firms in continental Europe. The Study
Group was the nucleus of an international private regime of
standard setters, constituted in 1973 as International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC). The IASC brought together a small
community of private experts from different national backgrounds
that became wanderers between the Anglo-Saxon and continental
European accounting worlds (e.g. Germany, France, Netherlands).
Many of them had worked at the five or six leading auditing
companies from the UK or the US that dominate the industry
(among them KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst&Young and
Deloitte and Touche). The IASC enhanced its legitimacy by
establishing contacts with national regulators of securities markets
like the American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and entered collaboration with the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with the aim to establish the
International Accounting Standards (IAS) as a recognized set of
standards for company access to stock exchanges. By transforming
the IASC into the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
in 2001, a full-time independent standard-setter was established.
The parallels between the structure of the IASB and the
organization structure of the American standard-setter FASB, but
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also the disproportionately high number of Anglo-Saxon members
in the Board and in its Financial Reporting Interpretations
Committee (IFRIC) (eight of 12 in 2006) have provoked criticisms of
it for being too attentive to US interests, to the interests of the “Big
Four” global accounting firms and to Anglo-Saxon accounting
philosophy in general. But despite its active participation in the
IASB, the U.S. still does not accept IASC standards as acceptable
alternative to their national accounting rules because they view
U.S.GAAP as superior in terms of coherence and legitimacy.
Moreover, the IFRS reflect the UK’s “principle-based approach” of
rule making that directs the focus on reporting the substance of
economic events whereas the American “rule-based approach”
puts more emphasis on detailed rules following the “letter of the
law” (Botzem and Quack 2006; Dewing and Russell 2004a, 2004b;
Mattli and Büthe 2005; Porter 2004).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Germany became confronted with
the reluctance of the U.S. to accept international accounting
standards as a ticket to the American capital market. Since the mid1980s, international equity markets grew, and particularly, U.S.
stock exchanges became central for global capital flows and
attractive for companies from other countries. In 1993, DaimlerBenz seeking to be listed at the NYSE, faced the difficulty that the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not consider
financial statements, produced on the basis of the EU accounting
directives or on the basis of national legislation, as acceptable. In
practice, many global players such as Deutsche Telekom, Hoechst,
SAP, Veba or SGL Carbon were asked to prepare a second set of
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.
This move of global players to leave the domestic camp did not
only reflect the market power of American regulators, but in turn
led to an overhaul of the EU Commission’s strategy to harmonize
accounting standards. In the view of the European Commission, it
was not acceptable that EU firms had to adopt a standard of
another jurisdiction to get access to international capital markets. In
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November 1995, after lengthy discussions with member states and
interested parties the Commission published a Communication
(COM 95 (508) in which it suggested to refrain from further efforts
of harmonizing accounting standards for consolidated accounts
and to put instead its weight behind the international
harmonization process already under way in the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Global players should be
allowed to prepare only one set of financial statements, preferably
in accordance with IAS (van Hulle 2004: 355-357). A new impetus
came with the Financial Services Action Plan of 1999, which
contained some forty measures, the implementation of which
should contribute to the realization of the integrated market for
financial services in the EU. In the area of financial reporting, the
Action Plan proposed that all listed EU companies report under the
same accounting framework and had to prepare their consolidated
accounts in accordance with IAS at the latest from 2005 onward.
With approval of the European Parliament and the European
Council the Commission issued a Regulation on the application of
IAS in June 2002 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which was
directly applicable in all member states. The new standards are
endorsed by the EU Commission on the basis of a comitology
procedure. The Commission is assisted by the Accounting
Regulatory Committee (ARC) comprising member states’
representatives and further observers, and by a private sector
working group, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group
(EFRAG) that should advise the ARC and contribute to the work of
the IASB. A new standard is endorsed if a majority of member
states in the ARC is in favor of the proposal, and, once the opinion
of the European Parliament is known, the Commission formally
issues the appropriate Regulation. Due to a constitutional reform of
the comitology system in 2006 however, the European Parliament
now may object to the adoption of a standard proposal even if the
Commission intends to adopt it (Christiansen and Vaccari 2006;
Dewing and Russell 2004a, 2004b). Thus, triggered by U.S. market
power and by political pressure of American regulators, a
multilevel framework for the endorsement of accounting standards
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has been set up in the EU which was also meant to provide for
proper representation of “European interests” in the private regime
of accounting experts.
Germany adapted the domestic institutions of setting accounting
standards to the new private multilevel framework, but the
transformation was contested by the political and economic forces
involved. Global companies on the one hand pushed policy makers
to proceed swiftly with legislation allowing them to depart from
the German Commercial Code (HGB). They were interested in
saving financial reporting costs by preparing their consolidated
accounts according to U.S.GAAP or IAS only. Smaller and midsized firms on the other hand defended the HGB and anticipated
further pressures on non-listed firms to prepare their annual
accounts based on IAS as well. Policy makers of different parties
were concerned with the loss of national sovereignty through
handing over the task of setting accounting standards for listed
firms to a private body that was largely self-controlled. Doing so
would not conform to the German tradition of making accounting
standards through parliamentary legislation. Moreover, it was not
foreseeable if there would be a possible linkage of the commercial
account based on U.S.GAAP or IAS and the tax account and its
implication for the public tax base – would the state still be able to
calculate its revenue? (Interviews D 11, D 18, D 23).
Meanwhile, concerns about the representation of continental
European interests in the private multilevel framework have
intensified. In May 2005 the Justice Committee of German
parliament organized a public hearing to explore further options to
politically influence the standard setting process which was
considered as intransparent, complex and too speedy to keep up
with. The IASB is seen to reflect the view of auditors trained in
Anglo-Saxon accounting philosophy while showing lacking
openness to complaints of users and preparers of financial reports,
and to the perspective of small and mid-sized firms in particular.
Proposals of European commentators (such as UNICE and EFRAG)
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to change the constitution of the International Accounting
Standards Foundation (IASCF) in a way to give those parties
additional weight that have already adopted or are heading for
adoption of IFRS/IAS have not been followed yet (Deutscher
Bundestag 2005: 102; 188-189).
Further criticism centers on the European endorsement process of
standards issued by the IASB. The European Commission has
endorsed virtually all international accounting standards with the
exception of IAS 39 that was endorsed after a lengthy debate and
discussion subject to “two carve outs”. The EC’s decision reflected
intense lobbying by French and German banks, and even the
intervention of President Chirac on this matter. A German Member
of the conservative EPP-ED fraction in the European Parliament has
announced that, from 2007 onward, the EP would not hesitate to
veto the adoption of IFRS standards submitted to it even after a
positive opinion from the comitology and the Commission. The
IASB should be put under pressure to open its decision making
process up to the political arena in general and to European
interests in particular (Interview EU 16). So far, the IASB defines its
independence as overruling principle allowing to shield the private
and technically defined standard setting process against any effort
of political intervention (Interviews D7, D 24).
Large companies, auditors, but also EFRAG representatives see the
international harmonization process in danger if the endorsement
process should produce a European version of IFRS not accepted
by the rest of the world. In order to avoid the creation of a
“European GAAP”, EFRAG considers the non-endorsement of
standards and interpretations as “last resort only” and
recommends a pro-active European role on the global level which,
given the distribution of power within the IASB, is practically
difficult (Deutscher Bundestag 2005: 90-96).
Recent struggles center around the latest IASB project to develop a
“light version” of IFRS suiting the needs of SMEs. Smaller
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companies and German industry associations contest the draft
version of the “SMEs Pervasive Principles” submitted in February
2007 because of their complexity and lacking necessity in general.
In Germany and also in France the main business model has been
the private, not listed, often family-owned company, traditionally
not considered accountable to a wider public of investors. Given
that the IFRS framework primarily suits the needs of firms seeking
capital on international capital markets, the German Mittelstand is
concerned of growing reporting costs and unknown implications
for the companies’ own capital base (Handelsblatt, 2 and 7
February 2006; 19 February 2007). The European Commission will
not require mandatory application of the SME standard, but leaves
the decision to the member states. Nevertheless, larger and more
internationalized firms in general (with a turnover of more than 60
mio. Euro per year) and especially subsidiaries of international
groups feel increasingly under market pressure by their
headquarters, rating agencies, foreign money lenders such as banks
or private equity firms to speak an “international language” and to
report based on IFRS (DIHK and PWC 2005: 5; 22; Conference
Minutes 2006).

IV. COMPARISON
The German model of corporate governance regulation is
undergoing substantial transformation in the two regulatory fields
studied here. Both cases display a certain amount of convergence
on Anglo-Saxon standards with the case of internal governance
signifying much more stability of the domestic institutional
framework than the field of accounting. By analyzing our cases in
more detail however, we find substantial differences with regard to
the outcomes of transformation and the driving forces and
mechanisms behind them.
The German regulatory framework governing internal corporate
governance has moved towards the Anglo-Saxon model in terms of
standards and regulatory instruments, but not with regard to the
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institutional structure. Internal governance still operates on the
basis of a two-tier board system with paritary co-determination for
large companies. Following Anglo-Saxon examples, self-regulation
via a code of conduct now plays an important role in setting the
standards governing corporate behavior. Yet, soft law is still not as
prominent as in the Anglo-Saxon world due to the strict statutory
framework which has not been deregulated.
While the first initiative in the mid-1990s has come from the
political sector, the regulatory reforms have really been driven by a
domestic “modernization coalition” comprising the government,
global players in finance and industry, company law experts and
the public “figurehead” of German institutional investors. The
internationalization of financial markets coupled with general
concerns about the competitiveness of German companies
prompted state and private actors to reassess the traditional
corporate governance regime (cf. Cioffi 2002). As the significance of
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors and of their expectations in
terms of best practice standards increased, the German
modernizers felt under pressure to adhere more closely to the
concepts espoused by these players. However, foreign investor
pressure operated in an indirect fashion, as these investors, by and
large, did not participate directly in the national reforms. Their
expectations and interests were transmitted into the national
reform arena mainly by domestic actors. Domestic investors were
too weak to push through reforms by themselves. However, the
adaptation to Anglo-Saxon standards proceeded only so far, as the
position of traditional corporate insiders was not fundamentally
challenged. The business community and the trade unions strongly
opposed regulatory changes that would have considerably
impaired their interests.
Consequently, market forces emanating from the international
capital markets were the dominant mechanism driving regulatory
convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model. The adoption of
Anglo-Saxon reform concepts proceeded by way of policy
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emulation (cf. Rose 1993). Thus, domestic reformers looked to the
British code, the French best practice recommendations and to
statements from international organizations which were colored by
Anglo-Saxon patterns of thought as sources of inspiration in
writing the German code. Vertical mechanisms operating through
direct political power exercised by the US or EU harmonization
efforts did not play a large role. EU multilevel governance is weak
in this field, as the European Commission resorts to instruments of
soft law which give national actors broad latitude. EU pressure on
national regimes results chiefly from negative, not from positive
integration.
Compared with the case of internal governance, the German
accounting model has been completely overhauled in response to
Anglo-Saxon power. On the firm side, the segment of globally
oriented preparers of accounts and of auditors (Big Four) has
converged on Anglo-Saxon financial reporting standards and has
accepted related requirements to regulate accounting business. A
“public interest model” of setting accounting standards has been
adopted reflecting Anglo-Saxon efforts to distance standard setting
bodies from the accountancy profession. Moreover, accounting
standards are now set by private actors, a development considered
painful by German politicians and small and mid-sized firms.
While global players decouple from old practices of insider
monitoring and reporting, smaller and mid-sized firms still grapple
with the costs that spillovers of rules made for the top tier of large
firms may impose on them. To that extent the study exemplifies the
fissures of the national model of corporate capitalism resulting from
worldwide developments that have been studied elsewhere (Lütz
2000, 2005).
None of these changes would have happened without the
structural power (Strange 1994, 1996) of Anglo-Saxon actors and of
the United States in particular. Anglo-Saxon expert power was
crucial in order to shift the model of private standard setting on to
the global arena thereby preventing both legislators and lobby

2007]

ON THE ROAD TO ANGLO-SAXON CAPITALISM?

25

groups from effective intervention. Power based on expertise links
up with market power to the extent that the Big Four accounting
firms and virtually all other medium sized accounting companies
with international practice have strong Anglo-American origins
and dominate the market for listed firms. The implication is that
Anglo-Saxon accounting practice is commonly regarded without
question as “best practice” thus achieving hegemony without
having to try very hard (Dewing/Russell 2004a: 24). Moreover,
given the attractiveness of the American capital market for foreign
companies, US regulators could easily turn domestic market power
into political power, by requiring compliance with US accounting
standards in order to get listed at the NYSE.
The picture would be incomplete, however, without taking the role
of the European Union into account. The EU has stepped up her
coordination efforts in response to European companies using the
exit option and adopting US GAAP, and to US pressures to impose
national law and regulation to European companies. Meanwhile,
the EU has set up a multilevel comitology framework to provide
input to private standard setting processes within the IASB. To that
extent it is not only due to American hegemony, but also to
intensified coordination within the EU that national actors are more
restricted than ever to shape the rules and structures of the
accounting world autonomously. It remains an open question to
what extent the potential losers of this process will find a channel
for interest representation in this multilevel framework.
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Table 1: Internal Governance and Accounting Regulation in
Comparison
Internal Governance
Outcome of
Transformation

Institutional
Framework for decisionmaking

Accounting

Moderate degree of
convergence

High degree of
convergence

(convergence on codes
of conduct, but not on
institutions)

(convergence on
standards and on
institutions)

National Arena

International Multilevel
System

Actor Constellation

Government, Company
Law Experts, Global
Players, Financial
Institutions, indirect
pressure by institutional
investors

Global Players, Big
Four Auditing Companies,
US-Regulators, EU
Commission

Dominant Mechanism
To Convergence

Emulation triggered by
perceived market pressure

Multilevel coordination
triggered by Anglo-Saxon
power

Emulation

Coordination
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V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, our analysis of the changes in German corporate
governance regulation shows that sectoral differences matter. Our
findings contradict the predictions of International Political
Economy as well as of Comparative Political Economy, as we see
neither a uniform trend towards convergence nor highly pathdependant processes of change in the two fields studied here. Both
approaches provide important insights for studying the
transformation processes. Applying the perspective of International
Political Economy allows us to trace the transnational forces that
triggered convergence in the area of internal governance and in
accounting. Moreover, this approach has a high explanatory power
for the field of accounting where harmonization efforts were not
only prompted by transnational actors, but also directly
coordinated within an international multilevel system. As the
confluence of Anglo-Saxon hegemony and legislative activities by
the EU left national decision-makers with relatively little leeway,
the transnational focus of International Political Economy captures,
to a large extent, the dynamics of the transformation process and its
outcome.
However, the limits of the International Political Economy
approach are obvious in cases of partial adaptation, as it is largely
insensitive to national institutional configurations which still create
powerful restrictions and opportunity structures for national
actors. These national factors filtered and moderated transnational
influences in the field of internal governance regulation, where
national actors had greater latitude in devising their reform
strategies. The Varieties of Capitalism perspective is certainly
helpful for identifying such fault lines in externally induced
processes of adaptation. The fact that until recently neither political
actors nor corporations were willing to initiate a reform of the
codetermination regime points to the staying power of institutions
deeply rooted in the national political economy. Yet, an approach
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focusing on the comparative advantages stemming from traditional
institutional arrangements can hardly explain the deliberate
insertion of market-oriented norms of transparency and
shareholder accountability into the regulatory framework
governing internal corporate structures.
Both political economy approaches fail to account for the
substantial variance between our two cases. Our analysis leads us
to conclude that the sectorally distinct interplay of national and
transnational actors was the crucial factor shaping the processes
and the outcome of regulatory regime transformation. Evidently,
political coordination within a framework of multilevel governance
turned out to be a more potent mechanism for convergence than
market-driven emulation at the national level. Different actor
constellations made for different regulatory arenas. In the case of
accounting, the US imposed its standards and regulatory
requirements on foreign private issuers, thus coupling market
power with direct political pressure. This helped the European
Commission to overcome the political conflicts engendered by the
national varieties of capitalism and thus to effectively harmonize
standards and oversight structures. In contrast, US regulators did
not require foreign companies seeking access to their capital
markets to comply with the Corporate Governance Listing
Standards of the NYSE and the NASDAQ which stipulate
independence requirements for boards. This different approach
may stem from the traditional emphasis placed on financial
disclosure to protect shareholders’ interests and the limited
jurisdiction of the SEC in the field of internal governance. The
European Commission resorted to soft law in this area. In effect,
decision-making was left primarily to national actors.
Consequently, we need to link the political economy perspectives
to a policy analysis approach in order to grasp the specific interplay
of markets, actor constellations and institutional arenas in different
fields of corporate governance regulation.
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NOTES
1

This paper presents preliminary findings of an ongoing research project (2005-2008)
on the transformation of corporate governance regulation in the EU (Germany,
United Kingdom) and the United States. The project is financed by the German
Research Association (No. LU 867/1-2). An earlier version was presented at the
APSA Annual Meeting, August 31-September 3, 2006 in Philadelphia. We are
indebted to John Cioffi and to the participants of the discussion for helpful
comments.
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